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GUILT BY ASSOCIATION is an attractive principle to lawenforcement officials concerned about preventing future harms.Without the concept of guilt by association, government officials
must carry out costly investigations to catch individuals in the act of
either committing a crime, or conspiring to commit one. Guilt by associa-
tion, by contrast, permits the government to incarcerate persons based
not on their involvement in past illegal conduct, and not even on their
involvement in planning future crimes, but on the basis of their affiliation
or association with others who have engaged in illegal conduct.
The United States’ formative experience with guilt by association came
during the Cold War. Fearing a communist takeover, Congress made
membership in the Communist Party a criminal offense, in a statute
known as the Smith Act. In 1961, in Scales v United States, the Supreme
Court considered the validity of this law.1 The Court interpreted the
statute narrowly in order to avoid the grave constitutional concerns that
it said the statute would otherwise present. As the Court explained, the
First Amendment right of association includes the right to associate with
groups that have both legal and illegal aims, so long as the individual
does not seek to further the group’s illegal aims. In addition, the Fifth
Amendment requires proof of ‘personal guilt’, and therefore precludes
holding an individual criminally liable for the acts of another (group or
individual) absent proof that the individual sought to further the other’s
illegal conduct.2 In the interest of avoiding the constitutional problems
1 367 US 203 (1961).
2 Ibid, at 224–7.
presented by a broad ban on membership, the Court in Scales interpreted
the Smith Act to require proof that the defendant specifically intended to
further the Communist Party’s illegal ends. Mere association, or associa-
tion in furtherance of the Party’s legal ends (such as its civil rights
advocacy or labour union organising), were insufficient to violate the
statute. Only a showing of specific intent, the Court said, would distin-
guish those who seek to further illegal ends from those who associate for
legal purposes. While the Court’s decision in Scales was technically an
interpretation of the statute, it was driven by its constitutional analysis,
and subsequent cases treated Scales as establishing a constitutional prin-
ciple, not just a reading of a specific statute.3
There the law essentially stood – until 11 September 2001. In the wake
of the terrorist attacks of that day, the Bush administration aggressively
pursued a theory of collective guilt that for all practical purposes revived
the tactics of the Cold War. In the name of cutting off support for terrorist
organisations, US law now makes it a crime to provide anything of
support – from dues to volunteer services – to any organisation or
individual that the government has label;ed ‘terrorist’.4 The prohibition is
not limited to those who intend to support the illegal or terrorist acts of
so-called terrorist organisations. It criminalises any and all support –
including support that is otherwise entirely lawful, peaceful and non-
violent. Indeed, the criminal bar applies even to aid that is designed to
reduce a group’s reliance on violence, and even where the aid can be
shown to have had precisely that beneficial effect.5 Thus, the government
has argued that the material support law prohibits a human rights group
from providing human rights training to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in
Turkey, even though the undisputed purpose of the training is to encour-
age that group to resolve its differences with the Turkish government
through peaceful, non-violent, legal means.6
The government insists that these laws do not impose guilt by associa-
tion, because the laws target not association per se, but ‘material sup-
port’, and several courts have accepted that distinction.7 But in the end, it
is largely a distinction without a difference, for what good is it to have a
right to join or associate with a group if the government can make it a
3 See, eg, NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, 458 US 886, 932 (1982) (guilt by association
violates the First Amendment).
4 See Section II below.
5 Ibid.
6 See Humanitarian Law Project v Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir 2000) (declaring prohibition
on providing ‘training’ and ‘personnel’ to designated terrorist organisations unconstitu-
tional because it could make it a crime to, for example, teach international law); Humanitar-
ian Law Project v US Dept of Treasury, 473 F Supp 2d 1049, 1059–63 (CD Cal 2006) (upholding
criminal ban on providing all ‘services’ to designated terrorist groups, where regulation
defined services to include ‘educational’ and ‘legal’ services, among others).
7 See, eg, Humanitarian Law Project v Reno, 205 F.3d 1130.
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crime to do anything whatsoever on the group’s behalf? No association
can survive without the support of its members.
Just as the fear of future threats from communism in the Cold War
spawned a sweeping approach that failed to distinguish between the
culpable and the innocent, so too the fear of future terrorist attacks in the
wake of 11 September 2001 has created a similar initiative. Moreover,
through the United Nations, the United States has sought to encourage
other nations to adopt a similar approach, with some success.
This chapter argues that the ‘material support’ principle is ‘guilt by
association’ in twenty-first-century garb, and presents all of the same
problems that criminalising membership and association did during the
Cold War. I will first outline the ways in which guilt by association has
been revived through the concept of penalising ‘material support’ for
organisations labelled terrorist. I will then discuss the constitutional
questions that these laws present, and sketch how the courts have, at
least thus far, resolved those questions. In short, the courts have sought
to trim the worst excesses of the laws, but have been largely unwilling to
confront head on their fundamental infirmity – the imposition of guilt by
association without any proof of intent to further any terrorist acts.
Finally, I will conclude by explaining how the material support laws fit
into the United States’ broader ‘paradigm of prevention’ in confronting
the threat of terrorism. That term, coined by former Attorney General
John Ashcroft, describes an amalgam of tactics in which the government
employs highly coercive and intrusive measures against groups and
individuals based not on proof of past wrongdoing, but on necessarily
speculative fears about what they might do in the future.8 The material
support laws further this goal by expanding the definition of what
constitutes a past crime, just as the Smith Act membership provision of
the Cold War era did. These laws are not purely preventive, in that they
8 Attorney General Ashcroft first announced this preventive policy in a speech to the
US Conference of Mayors in October 2001. As he put it: ‘Let the terrorists among us be
warned: If you overstay your visa – even by one day – we will arrest you. If you violate a
local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. We will use every
available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all our weapons
within the law and under the Constitution to protect life and enhance security for America.
In the war on terror, this Department of Justice will arrest and detain any suspected terrorist
who has violated the law. Our single objective is to prevent terrorist attacks by taking
suspected terrorists off the street’: Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft for
the US Mayors Conference, 25 October 2001, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/
ag/speeches/2001/agcrisisremarks10_25.htm>. See also Prepared Remarks of Attorney
General John Ashcroft, Council on Foreign Relations, 10 February 2003 (‘In order to fight
and to defeat terrorism, the Department of Justice has added a new paradigm to that of
prosecution – a paradigm of prevention.’), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/
ag/speeches/2003 /021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm>.
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do require proof of some past ‘wrongdoing’. But their expansive defini-
tions of wrongdoing stretch that concept beyond its limits in the name of
preventing future harm.
The same preventive justification that underlies the material support
laws has also led the United States to embark on indiscriminate preven-
tive detention schemes; to use highly coercive interrogation techniques
amounting, at least in some circumstances, to torture; and to wage war
‘preventively’ against Iraq, a country that neither attacked the United
States nor posed a threat of imminent attack. The centrality of the
‘preventive paradigm’ to the rationale for the material support laws
suggests strong reason for scepticism about their fairness, and under-
scores the need for careful scrutiny of their application.
II. THE LEGAL REGIME
Three different federal laws authorise US officials to designate groups or
individuals as ‘terrorist’ and then punish ‘material support’ provided to
them. All three statutes share a common attribute – they penalise support
of designated groups or persons without regard to the character or intent
of the support provided, and without regard to the effect of the support
in question. Thus, aid having nothing to do with terrorism, and even aid
designed to discourage terrorism, is treated identically to aid designed to
further terrorism. In addition, all three statutes afford federal officials
wide discretion – a virtual ‘blank cheque’ – in selecting disfavoured
groups or persons for designation. And all three statutes provide inad-
equate procedures for challenging designations.
A. The Criminal ‘Material Support’ Statute – 18 USC §2339B and 8
USC §1189
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996,
amended by the USA Patriot Act in 2001, and again in 2004, authorises
the Secretary of State to designate ‘foreign terrorist organizations’, and
makes it a crime for anyone to support even the wholly lawful, non-
violent activities of those designated organisations.9
The law works in two steps: designation and prohibition. As an initial
matter, the Secretary of State
is authorized to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization …
if the Secretary finds that –
9 See 8 USC § 1189 and 18 USC § 2339B.
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(a) the organization is a foreign organization;
(b) the organization engages in terrorist activity; and
(c) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of the United States.10
The term ‘terrorist activity’ is broadly defined far beyond its commonly
understood meaning to include virtually any unlawful use of, or threat to
use, a weapon against person or property, unless for mere personal
monetary gain. ‘National security’ is also broadly defined to mean
‘national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United
States’. The Secretary’s determination that a group’s activities threaten
US ‘national security’ under the statute is judicially unreviewable.11
Thus, this statute is not limited to terrorist organisations as they are
commonly understood, or to national security as it is commonly under-
stood, but broadly empowers the Secretary to designate any foreign
group that has used or threatened to use a weapon and whose activities
are deemed contrary to the United States’ economic interest.
The second step is the prohibition of support. Once the Secretary
designates an organisation and publishes the designation in the Federal
Register, it becomes a crime, punishable by up to 15 years of imprison-
ment (or life imprisonment if death results) and a substantial fine, to
‘knowingly provide[] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or [to] attempt[] or conspire[] to do so’.12 ‘Material support
or resources’ is defined as:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert
advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, com-
munications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, per-
sonnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.13
The statute does not on its face require any showing that the defendant
intended that his donation be used for any illicit purpose. The United
States maintains that Congress in effect adopted an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that all support to such organisations furthers their terrorist
ends.14 In fact, Congress heard no testimony about any particular terror-
ist organisations that would support such a presumption even as to that
10 8 USC § 1189(a)(1).
11 People’s Mojahedin Org of Iran v US Sec of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (DC Cir 1999), cert
denied, 529 US 1104 (2000).
12 18 USC § 2339B(a).
13 18 USC § 2339A(b).
14 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub L No 104–132, § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat
1214, 1247 (24 April 1996).
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group, much less as to all groups that might henceforth be labelled
‘foreign terrorist organisations’. At the same time, and directly contrary
to this presumption, the statute permits the donation of unlimited
amounts of medicine and religious materials to designated organisations.
And a provision added in 2005 permits the Secretary of State and
Attorney General to grant advance approval for aid in the form of
‘training’, ‘personnel,’ and ‘expert advice or assistance’ where the Secre-
tary determines that the aid may not be used to carry out terrorist
activity.15 Thus, the statute expressly discriminates between religious and
political aid, permitting unlimited amounts of religious aid (even if it is
intended to further terrorist activity),16 while barring all political aid,
even if it counters terrorism and promotes peace.
Procedures for challenging designation are largely a sham. Once the
Secretary of State designates a group and publishes that fact in the
Federal Register, the designated group has 30 days to file a legal chal-
lenge in the federal court of appeals in Washington, DC. Even if it
manages to learn of the designation, find a lawyer, and file the challenge
in time, the review process is one-sided. The court does not consider any
new evidence, but merely reviews the evidence the State Department
developed unilaterally. The State Department is able to present the record
in secret and behind closed doors, so the designated group in many
instances will not even be able to see the evidence used against it. And as
noted above, the critical criterion – that the group’s activities threaten
‘national security’,— has been deemed unreviewable by the courts.17 Not
surprisingly, no group has succeeded in challenging its designation
under this law.
B. Immigration Consequences of ‘Material Support’ under 8 USC
§1182
Immigration law also penalises ‘material support’, but does so even more
expansively than the criminal law. Foreign nationals can be denied entry
or deported for having provided material support not only to organisa-
tions designated as ‘terrorist’, but even to organisations that have never
been designated terrorist, but merely have at some point threatened to
use a weapon against person or property. In one case, for example, a
15 18 USC § 2339B(j).
16 18 USC § 2339A prohibits the provision of ‘material support or resources’ for the
purpose of furthering specified terrorist activities, but then exempts the provision of
‘medicine and religious articles’ from the definition of ‘material support’. Accordingly, even
if an individual donated medicine for the purpose of furthering terrorist activity, his action
would not be prohibited by the ‘material support’ provisions: 18 USC §§ 2339A and 2339B.
17 See n 11 above.
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national of India was deported for having set up a tent for religious
services that were then attended by, among others, some members of an
Indian guerrilla organisation.18 Moreover, the Department of Homeland
Security, which enforces immigration law, interprets this provision to
apply even to those who are coerced into providing material support to
such a group. Thus, if guerrillas ransack a village and demand food at
gunpoint, anyone who relents and gives them food will, absent a waiver,
be deemed inadmissible to the United States for having materially
supported a terrorist group.19
In another case the government invoked these immigration provisions
to seek the deportation of two long-time lawful permanent residents,
Khader Hamide and Michel Shehadeh, for having provided ‘material
support’ to a ‘terrorist organization’ by distributing PLO magazines in
Los Angeles in the 1980s, when it was fully lawful to do so (the
magazines were then and are still available in libraries across the nation).
The government never alleged that Hamide or Shehadeh sought to
further any illegal activities of the PLO group they were alleged to have
supported. But under the government’s view of the immigration law,
that fact was irrelevant. (In October 2007, after a 21-year legal battle, and
after an immigration judge dismissed the case for prosecutorial miscon-
duct, the government abandoned its efforts to deport Hamide and
Shehadeh).
C. Embargoing Individuals and Groups under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act
The third statute that the government relies upon to penalise support of
‘terrorists’ is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA).20 This statute was originally enacted to empower the President
during emergencies to impose economic embargoes on foreign nations. It
was used exclusively for that purpose until 1995, when President Bill
Clinton first used it not to target nations as a matter of nation-to-nation
diplomacy but to target disfavoured political groups. Clinton named ten
Palestinian organisations and two Jewish groups as ‘specially designated
terrorists’.21 Designation under IEEPA has the effect of freezing the
entity’s assets in the United States and making it a crime for anyone in
18 Singh-Kaur v Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3rd Cir, 2004).
19 Human Rights First, ‘Abandoning the Persecuted: Victims of Terrorism and Oppres-
sion Barred From Asylum’ (2006); Refugee Council USA, ‘The Material Support Problem:
Punishing Refugee Victims of Terror: March 8, 2007’, available at <http://www.rcusa.org/
uploads/pdfs/ms-backgrd-info3–8-07.pdf>.
20 50 USC §§1701–06 (2000).
21 Executive Order 12947 (1995).
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the United States to engage in any transactions with the groups, again
regardless of the purpose and effect of the support in question.22 After
the attacks of 11 September 2001, President Bush invoked the same
authority to name 27 ‘specially designated global terrorists’.23 He offered
no explanation for why any of them were designated, or any criteria used
for the determination. At the same time, he authorised the Secretary of
the Treasury to designate still others using extremely broad criteria. Until
recently, the Treasury Secretary could designate an individual or entity
based solely on a finding that he or it was merely ‘otherwise associated
with’ someone else on the list.24
Hundreds of individuals and groups have been placed on this ‘terror-
ist’ list since 2001. Remarkably, there is no definition in federal statutes of
a ‘specially designated terrorist’ or a ‘specially designated global terror-
ist’. Thus, the President and the Secretary of Treasury can apply these
labels to literally anyone or any group that can conceivably be reached
under IEEPA. The only limitation IEEPA places is that there must be
some ‘foreign interest’ in the entity or person designated, but that term
has been applied very loosely. Indeed, IEEPA has been used to designate
a US citizen, Mohammed Salah, a resident of Chicago.25 Under the terms
of IEEPA, it is a crime to provide Mr Salah with anything of value, or
even to make a donation to him. Literally applied and enforced, the
designation would lead to Mr Salah starving to death, since it would be a
crime for anyone even to sell or give him a loaf of bread. Yet this penalty
was imposed without any jury, without any notice, without any hearing,
and without any statutory definition of the label imposed.
Groups or individuals designated under this authority may challenge
their designation in federal courts, but as with the State Department list
described above, the court will not take any new evidence. The court
reviews the designation entirely on the administrative record created by
the Treasury Department, in most instances without any input from the
designated entity.26 Here, too, the government can defend its designation
22 50 USC §§1701–06.
23 Executive Order 13224 (18 September 2001).
24 In 2006, a federal court declared that provision unconstitutional: Humanitarian Law
Project v US Dept of Treasury, 463 F Supp 2d 1049 (CD Cal, 2006). The Treasury Department
then amended its regulations to define ‘otherwise associated’ more narrowly, to mean those
entities or individuals that ‘own or control; or (b) … attempt, or … conspire with one or
more persons, to act for or on behalf of or to provide financial, material, or technological
support, or financial or other services, to a designated entity’: 31 CFR § 594.316 (2007). The
district court upheld the term as narrowed: Humanitarian Law Project v US Dept of Treasury,
484 FSupp2d 1099, 1105–07 (CD Cal, 2007).
25 See D Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on
Terrorism, revised edn (New York, NY, New Press, 2005) 78.
26 See, eg, Holy Land Foundation v Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (DC Cir, 2003), cert denied, 540
US 1218 (2004); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192, 207
(DC Cir, 2001).
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by submitting secret evidence that the court examines outside the pres-
ence of the challenger. Here, too, the decks are stacked; no one has yet
succeeded in challenging their designation in court.27
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
The statutes described above prohibit virtually all associational support
to selected political organisations, while granting executive branch offi-
cials effectively unreviewable discretion to target disfavoured groups.
These laws make it a crime to write an opinion piece for a newspaper,
provide legal advice, volunteer one’s time, or distribute a magazine for
any ‘designated’ group, even if there is no connection whatsoever
between the individual’s support and any illegal activity of the pro-
scribed group.
Under these statutes, a US citizen who sends a treatise on non-violence
to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party to encourage it to forgo violence for
peace can be sent to prison for 15 years. This is so even if he proves that
he intended the treatise to be used only for peaceful ends, and that it was
in fact used solely for that purpose. Such a moral innocent can be said to
be ‘guilty’ only by association.
The Supreme Court has declared guilt by association ‘alien to the
traditions of a free society and the First Amendment itself’.28 It violates
both the Fifth Amendment, which requires that guilt must be personal,
and the First Amendment, which guarantees the right of association.
The statutes are analytically indistinguishable from the McCarthy era
laws that penalised association with the Communist Party. Congress
specifically found that the Communist Party was a foreign-dominated
group engaged in terrorism for the purpose of overthrowing the United
States.29 The Supreme Court did not question that finding, but nonethe-
less ruled that even with respect to such a group, individuals could not
be penalised for their associations absent proof of ‘specific intent’ to
further the group’s illegal ends.30 The material support statutes require
no ‘specific intent’, and punish people solely for their associational
support of specified groups.
27 See, eg, Islamic American Relief Agency v Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (DC Cir, 2007); Global
Relief Foundation, Inc v O’Neil (GRF), 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir, 2002); Holy Land Foundation v.
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C.Cir. 2003).
28 NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, 458 US 886, 932 (1982).
29 50 USC § 781 (West, 1991) (repealed 1993).
30 See, eg, United States v Robel, 389 US 258, 262 (1967) (government could not ban
Communist Party members from working in defence facilities absent proof that they had
specific intent to further the Party’s unlawful ends); Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589,
606 (1967) (‘[m]ere knowing membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful
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The courts have nonetheless largely approved of these laws. In the
leading case, Humanitarian Law Project v Reno, the US Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the criminal material support statute
is valid because it does not penalise membership as such, but only
‘material support’.31 Several other courts have adopted that reasoning.32
But that distinction makes the prohibition on guilt by association a
meaningless formality; instead of criminalising membership of disfa-
voured groups, legislatures may simply criminalise the payment of dues
or volunteering of services to those groups. Since associations cannot
exist without the material support of their members, the court’s reason-
ing eviscerates the right of association.33
The notion that material support can be penalised even if membership
cannot is directly contrary to Supreme Court precedent. In NAACP v
Claiborne Hardware, for example, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that the leaders and members of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), a prominent civil rights
group, could not be held liable for injuries sustained during an NAACP-
led boycott that grew violent absent proof that ‘the individual[s] held a
specific intent to further [the boycott’s] illegal aims’.34 But if material
support is constitutionally distinct from association, the NAACP’s thou-
sands of individual donors could have been held liable without any
showing of specific intent, even if its leaders could not be.
aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis’ for barring employment in
the state university system to Communist Party members); Elfbrandt v Russell, 384 US 11, 19
(1966) (‘a law which applies to membership without the “specific intent” to further the
illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms’); Noto v
United States, 367 US 290, 299–300 (1961) (First Amendment bars punishment of ‘one in
sympathy with the legitimate aims of [the Communist Party], but not specifically intending
to accomplish them by resort to violence’).
31 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir, 2000), cert denied, 532 US 904 (2001).
32 United States v Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir, 2004); United States v Assi, 414 F. Supp.
2d 707 (ED Mich, 2006); United States v Paracha, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 1 (SDNY, 2006); Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development v Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (DC Cir, 2003).
33 As the Supreme Court has said, ‘The right to join together “for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas” … is diluted if it does not include the right to pool money through
contributions, for funds are often essential if “advocacy” is to be truly or optimally
“effective”’: Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 65–6 (1976) (quoting NAACP v Alabama, 357 US 449,
460 (1958)). Monetary contributions to political organisations are a protected form of
association and expression: ibid, at 16–17, 24–5; Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609
(1984) (First Amendment protects non-profit group’s right to solicit funds); Citizens Against
Rent Control v Berkeley, 454 US 290, 295–6 (1981) (monetary contributions to a group are a
form of ‘collective expression’ protected by the right of association); Service Employees Int’l
Union v Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 955 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir) (‘contributing money is
an act of political association that is protected by the First Amendment’), cert denied, 505
US 1230 (1992); In re Asbestos Litig, 46 F.3d 1284, 1290 (3rd Cir, 1994) (contributions to
political organisation are constitutionally protected absent specific intent to further the
group’s illegal ends).
34 458 US 886, 920 (1982).
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The asserted distinction between support and membership also cannot
be squared with the Fifth Amendment requirement that the government
prove personal guilt. In Scales v United States,35 discussed in the Introduc-
tion, the Supreme Court stated:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment
on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of
that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity, … that relationship
must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order
to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.36
(emphasis added)
In other words, the Fifth Amendment forbids holding a moral innocent
culpable for the acts of others. The principle is not limited to penalties
based on membership alone: it encompasses any punishment of ‘status or
conduct’ that ‘can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that
status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity’. The prohibition
on material support to specified groups is explicitly ‘justified by refer-
ence to the relationship of that . . . conduct to other concededly criminal
activity’, namely the group’s ‘terrorist activity’.
The asserted distinction between support and membership makes even
less sense under the Fifth Amendment principle of personal guilt than
under the First Amendment. Surely it seems more reasonable to attribute
criminal liability for a gang crime to a member of a violent gang than it
would to attribute liability to a social worker who provided the gang
with vocational training or counselling services. Yet under the courts’
analysis of the ‘material support’ laws, the gang member could not be
held liable absent proof of specific intent to further the gang’s illegal
ends, but the social worker could be.
The government has argued that broadly criminalising support even of
groups’ otherwise lawful activities is necessary because money is fungi-
ble, and therefore any support, even to legitimate activities, frees up
resources that can be used to support a group’s illegal activities. That
argument proves too much, for it would render nugatory the constitu-
tional ban on guilt by association. The fact that a group engages in illegal
activities – even illegal activities that threaten national security – does not
permit the government to prohibit association with the group’s legal
activities. Yet on the government’s view, because all support of a group
frees up resources that could be used for illegal activities, all support to
any group that engages in illegal activities could be criminalised. On this
theory, the fact that the Democratic and Republican Parties violate
campaign finance laws would authorise a prohibition on all support of
35 367 US 203 (1961).
36 Ibid, at 224–5.
Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the Paradigm of Prevention 243
those parties. The United States made just such a broad ‘freeing-up’
argument to the Supreme Court in Scales v United States as a reason for
rejecting the specific intent test, without success.37
In addition, neither these statutes nor the United States’ enforcement of
them is consistent with the freeing-up theory. As noted above, the
criminal material support statute itself permits unlimited donations of
‘medicine and religious articles’ to terrorist groups.38 Yet donations of
medicine and religious articles are just as capable of freeing up resources
as the prohibited donations. And the statute contemplates approval of
certain forms of training, expert advice or assistance, and personnel,
where the support may not be used to carry out terrorist activity. But
under the government’s theory, it should not matter if the support itself
may be used to pursue terrorism, because even if it cannot, it theoreti-
cally frees up other resources that can be so employed.
The courts have recognised that the breadth of the material support
statutes is troubling, and have invalidated the laws at their furthest
reaches. Thus, several courts have ruled that the definition of ‘material
support’ is too broad, and have struck down as unconstitutionally vague
the prohibitions on providing ‘training’, ‘expert advice or assistance’ and
‘services’ to terrorist groups.39 In addition, a federal court ruled unconsti-
tutional the President’s authorisation to the Secretary of the Treasury to
designate ‘specially designated global terrorists’ on the basis of mere
association and, as noted above, in the wake of that decision, the
government narrowed the ‘association’ ground considerably.40 These
decisions have been important in reining in the worst excesses of the
material support regime. But they leave in place its fundamental infir-
mity – the imposition of guilt by association.
Similarly, the courts have generally upheld the procedures employed
for designated entities to challenge their designation – while rejecting all
challenges that have come before them. The courts have to date permit-
ted the government to defend its designations using secret evidence not
37 Brief for the United States on Reargument at 8, Scales v United States, 367 US 203
(arguing that showing ‘specific intent’ is unnecessary ‘on the principle that knowingly
joining an organization with illegal objectives contributes to the attainment of those
objectives because of the support given by membership itself’).
38 18 USC § 2339A(b).
39 See Humanitarian Law Project v Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir, 2000) (declaring ‘training’
and ‘personnel’ unconstitutionally vague); Humanitarian Law Project v Gonzales, 380
F.Supp.2d 1134 (CD Cal, 2005) (declaring ‘training’. ‘expert advice or assistance’, and
‘services’ unconstitutionally vague); United States v Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d 348 (SDNY, 2003)
(declaring ‘personnel’ and ‘communications’ unconstitutionally vague).
40 See n 24 above.
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disclosed to the challenger, and have declined to accept evidence prof-
fered by the designated entities, limiting their decisions to the adminis-
trative record.41 The courts have required that where a designated entity
has a presence within the United States, due process requires that it be
afforded an opportunity to make a presentation in writing, to be included
as part of the administrative record. But that is the extent of the entity’s
opportunity to defend itself. No hearing is required, and accordingly
there is no opportunity to present witnesses or to confront the govern-
ment’s witnesses.42
To adhere to the constitutional prohibition on guilt by association and
bar criminalisation of material support without a showing of intent
would not leave the nation defenceless against terrorist plots. There are
many more precisely calibrated ways to stem the flow of funds for
terrorist activity. Congress can make and has made it a crime to provide
material support to a wide range of terrorist crimes.43 Conspiracy and
‘aiding and abetting’ statutes penalise not only those who actually
commit acts of violence, but also those who engage in overt acts in
furtherance of such conduct, even if the ultimate wrongdoing never
comes to fruition.44 Money laundering statutes expressly prohibit the
transmission of money or funds with the intent of promoting terrorist
activity.45 And the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), permits the government to target ostensibly legitimate
activities when they are a front for illegal conduct.46 Thus, the constitu-
tional prohibition on guilt by association permits the government to
criminalise the financing of terrorism. It simply requires it to target
terrorism rather than political association.
The international approach to terrorist financing illustrates a greater
sensitivity to concerns about guilt by association than is reflected by the
US regime. The United States has actively encouraged other nations to
41 See, eg, Holy Land Foundation v Aschroft, 333 F.3d 156.
42 National Council of Resistance to Iran v Department of State, 251 F.3d 192 (DC Cir, 2001).
43 18 USC §2339A(a) (criminalising aid to a long list of specific terrorist acts).
44 Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, for example, was convicted of seditious conspiracy for
his part in encouraging a plan to bomb various tunnels and bridges in New York City, even
though he did not undertake any violent act himself: United States v Rahman, 189 F.3d 88
(2nd Cir, 1999), cert denied, 528 US 1094 (2000).
45 The Money Laundering Control Act makes it a crime, among other things, to transmit
funds ‘with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity’, including
terrorism: 18 USC §1956(a)(2)(A). The USA PATRIOT Act added extensive new money
laundering provisions designed to facilitate the investigation, prevention, and prosecution
of money laundering related to terrorism: USA PATRIOT Act, §§ 301–76.
46 18 USC §§ 1961–8. RICO prohibits the acquisition or maintenance of any enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering, or with income derived from a pattern of racketeering: 18
USC § 1962. A wide range of terrorist activity and fundraising for terrorist activity is
included within the definition of racketeering activity: see 18 USC § 1961(1) and 18 USC §
2332b(g)(5).
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crack down on ‘terrorist financing’, and shortly after 11 September 2001
convinced the UN Security Council to issue Resolution 1373. That resolu-
tion, however, calls on all UN member states to enact laws criminalising
the willful provision or collection of funds with the knowledge or
intention that they will be used to carry out terrorist acts, and thus is in
keeping with a requirement of individualised intent.47 States are required
to freeze the assets of persons who facilitate terrorist acts.48
Many nations have responded, but generally by penalising only those
who provide material support with the intent of furthering terrorist acts,
not those who merely support a group without any intent to further its
criminal ends. The European Union, for example, maintains a list of
terrorist groups and supporters.49 Funds of those listed are frozen, and
the European Community is required to ensure that assets will not be
made available to the parties on the list.50 A European Council Frame-
work Decision of June 2002 on combating terrorism requires member
states to make it a crime to ‘participate in the activities of a terrorist
group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by
funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such
participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group’
(emphasis added).51 That formulation respects the principle of individual
culpability that the United States has abandoned.
These laws illustrate that it is possible to target terror financing while
being attentive to the distinction between intentional support of terrorist
acts, and aid to terrorist groups that is intended to further only lawful
ends. The European courts have also demanded greater procedural
protections for those who challenge their inclusion on the list, requiring,
for example, a statement of reasons and the right to a fair hearing.52
In short, the United States’ approach to material support for terrorist
organisations contravenes basic constitutional principles of fairness, due
process and the right of association. There are more narrowly tailored
alternatives available, as illustrated by the other US laws discussed
above, and by the responses of other nations to the same problem. Here,
as elsewhere in the ‘war on terror’, the United States has gone out on a
limb.
47 UN Security Council Resolution 1373, Art 1(b).
48 Ibid, Art 1(c).
49 The latest complete version of this list is at Council Common Position 2006/380/CFSP
of 29 May 2006, OJ L 144 p 25. (DOC 9).
50 2001/931/CFSP, Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of
specific measures to combat terrorism, OJ 2001 L344/93, at Arts 2 and 3. (DOC 10).
51 EC Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, Art 2.2(b).
52 Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council of the European Unio, Court of
First Instance of the European Communities (Second Chamber) (12 December 2006).
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IV. THE BROADER CONTEXT – THE PREVENTIVE PARADIGM
The material support regime is just one part of a much broader initiative
launched by the Bush administration in the wake of 11 September 2001.
The administration insisted that ‘everything changed’ after that date, and
that it must operate within a new paradigm of prevention. When suicide
bombers attack, prosecution after the fact is a patently insufficient
response – it is far better to stop them before they act. Citing the need to
prevent terrorist attacks, the administration has invoked the ‘preventive
paradigm’ at home and abroad as a justification for abandoning tradi-
tional limits on the use of coercive state power, and thereby freeing the
state to use force not merely reactively, to defend against attacks or to
punish wrongdoers, but proactively, to prevent terrorist attacks before
they are launched.53
The preventive rationale is what the United States used to justify its
decision to launch a war against Iraq. The Pentagon’s 2002 National
Security Strategy advanced a new and controversial ‘preventive’ justifi-
cation for going to war, arguing that in light of the threats now posed by
weapons of mass destruction, war is justified not only when the nation is
under attack or the threat of imminent attack – the only justifications
recognised by international law – but also when it faces a more specula-
tive but potentially catastrophic future threat.54 No one argued that an
attack by Iraq on the United States was imminent. Instead, the adminis-
tration contended that the potential for attack with weapons of mass
destruction at some undetermined time in the future and by some
undetermined terrorist group that might obtain the weapons from
Saddam Hussein was sufficient to justify war as a preventative measure.
The administration has similarly defended the use of cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment to interrogate al Qaeda suspects on the ground
that the information so obtained may help prevent future attacks. No one
defends torture or coercive interrogation as a way of solving past crimes
or punishing perpetrators – the only justification offered is the forward-
looking one of preventing future harms. And the administration has also
cited a ‘new paradigm’ to argue that the Geneva Conventions and other
rules of war do not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. It claimed that the
Geneva Conventions apply only to wars between nations and internal
civil wars, and that therefore traditionally recognised rules of war,
including the obligation to treat detainees humanely, are inapplicable at
53 For a more complete discussion and critique of the ‘paradigm of prevention’ dis-
cussed here, see D Cole and J Lobel, Less Safe, Less Free: Why America is Losing the War on
Terror (New York, NY, The New Press, 2007).
54 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17
September 2002, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.all.html>.
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Guantanamo and at secret CIA ‘black sites’ where al Qaeda detainees are
held.55 Here, too, the motive for denying Geneva Conventions protection
was precisely to allow interrogators to use coercive means to extract
intelligence from suspects.
At home, Attorney General John Ashcroft repeatedly trumpeted a
parallel new ‘paradigm of prevention’ in law enforcement and intelli-
gence gathering.56 Asserting that it would help prevent the next attack,
the administration subjected 82,000 Arab and Muslim immigrant men to
fingerprinting and registration, subjected 8,000 Arab and Muslim men to
FBI interviews, and preventively detained over 5,000 foreign nationals,
also nearly all Arabs and Muslims.57 As part of its preventive paradigm,
the government adopted an aggressive strategy of arrest and prosecution
on ‘pretextual’ minor charges – such as immigration violations, credit
card fraud or false statements – or on no charges at all, as ‘material
witnesses’, when it suspected them of terrorist ties but lacked the
evidence to try them for terrorism. On a similar preventive rationale, the
administration pushed for expansive new powers in the USA Patriot Act,
and since then the FBI has used that Act to issue annually tens of
thousands of ‘national security letters’ – administrative subpoenas that
demand the secret production of information on customers from tele-
phone and internet companies and financial institutions without any
court review.58 And most recently, the preventive rationale has been
advanced to justify the National Security Agency’s (NSA’s) warrantless
wiretapping of countless persons in the United States, without congres-
sional or judicial approval, pursuant to an executive order adopted in
secret and in contravention of a criminal prohibition on such surveil-
lance.59
The same preventive rationale underlies the material support laws.
The justification for criminalising human rights advocacy training or
humanitarian aid is not that such support is itself somehow morally
wrong, or harmful. The argument is that if we cut off all support to
55 The White House, Fact Sheet on Status of Detainees, 7 February 2002, available at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207–13.html>.
56 See n 8 above.
57 See Cole, n 25 above, at 25–35.
58 US Dept of Justice, Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion’s Use of National Security Letters (March 2007), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/special/s0703b/final.pdf>; D Eggen, ‘FBI Sought Data on Thousands in ’05’ The
Washington Post, 2 May 2006, A4.
59 In a radio address following disclosure of the NSAwarrantless wiretapping program,
President Bush argued that ‘the activities conducted under this authorization have helped
detect and prevent possible terrorist attacks in the United States and abroad’: GW Bush,
‘The President’s Radio Address’ 17 December 2005, available at <http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html>; see also R Stevenson and A Liptak, ‘Cheney
Defends Eavesdropping Without Warrants’, New York Times, 21 December 2005, A36.
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entities and individuals we label as ‘terrorists’, we will make it more
difficult for these entities and individuals to carry out terrorist activity in
the future. Thus, while material support laws as a formal matter punish
past acts, not future predictions, the justification for punishing the past
acts is the speculation that they might facilitate bad acts in the future.
Whether in the context of material support, interrogation, detention or
war-making, the preventive paradigm puts tremendous pressure on the
values we associate with the rule of law. Designed to place enforceable
constraints on state power, the rule of law generally reserves detention,
punishment and military force for those who have been shown, on the
basis of sound evidence and fair procedures, to have committed some
wrongful act in the past that warrants the government’s response. The
administration’s ‘preventive paradigm’, by contrast, justifies coercive
action – from detention to torture to bombing – on the basis of specula-
tion about future contingencies, without either the evidence or the fair
processes that have generally been considered necessary before the state
imposes coercive measures on human beings.
When the state begins to direct highly coercive measures at individuals
and other states based on necessarily speculative predictions about
future behaviour, it inevitably leads to substantial compromises on the
values associated with the rule of law – such as equality, transparency,
individual culpability, fair procedures and checks and balances. We have
seen just those compromises in the context of the material support laws.
Groups are selected for designation in a necessarily subjective and
secretive process, and denied a meaningful opportunity to challenge
their designations. Individuals are then held responsible not for their
own acts, but for their associational support of others, without regard to
whether the individual being punished has ever done anything to
facilitate violence. And the material support laws frustrate checks and
balances by granting the executive branch wide leeway in designation
decisions, and by providing for only a charade of judicial review.
V. CONCLUSION
Many of the United States’ initiatives in the ‘paradigm of prevention’
have come back to haunt it. Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib have done
incalculable damage to the United States’ image abroad. The round-up
and preventive detention of thousands of Arab and Muslim immigrants
within the United States after 11 September 2001, none of whom had any
connection to terrorism, has alienated Arab and Muslim communities
both at home and abroad, and the war in Iraq has been an unmitigated
disaster.
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The reason these measures have backfired is because they are so
inimical to the core values of the rule of law. So, too, the punishment of
material support, a twenty-first century version of guilt by association, is
contrary to fundamental principles, not only of US constitutional law, but
of international human rights law. In the long run, like other preventive
paradigm initiatives, it is likely to alienate potential allies, fuel the
propaganda of enemies, and inflict unnecessary harm on both the moral
innocents targeted, and on the reputation of the United States world-
wide. A lot may have changed after 11 September 2001, but not the need
to respond to wrongdoers within the framework of the rule of law.
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